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ABSTRACT 
Britain’s post-war interventions in former colonial territories remain a controversial 
area of contemporary history. In the case of India, recent releases of official records 
in the United Kingdom and South Asia have revealed details of British government 
anti-communist propaganda activity in the subcontinent during the Cold War period. 
This article focuses attention on covert or unattributable propaganda conducted in 
India by the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department (IRD). It specifically 
examines the 1960s: a time between the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war in 
1962, and the Indian general election of 1967, when IRD operations peaked. The 
Indian government welcomed British support in an information war waged against 
Communist China, but cooperation between London and New Delhi quickly waned. 
Britain’s propaganda initiative in India lacked strategic coherence, and cut across the 
grain of local resistance to anti-Soviet material. The British Government found itself 
running two separate propaganda campaigns in the subcontinent: one focused on 
Communist China, and declared to the Indian government; and a second, secret 
programme, targeting the Soviets. In this context, Whitehall found it difficult to 
implement an integrated and effective anti-communist propaganda offensive in India. 
 
Key words: Information Research Department; India; China; Sino-Indian War; 
propaganda. 
 
 
 
Whitehall’s post-war interventions in Britain’s former colonial territories remain a 
controversial area of contemporary history. In the case of India, the recent release of 
official source-material in the United Kingdom and South Asia opens up debates 
about the nature of British anti-communist activity in the subcontinent during the 
Cold War period.1 This article focuses on one aspect of Britain’s relationship with 
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India: covert or unattributable propaganda conducted by the Foreign Office’s 
Information Research Department (IRD). 2  It specifically examines the 1960s: a 
period between the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, and the Indian 
general election of 1967, when IRD operations peaked.  
In 1962, an ill-prepared and under resourced Indian government welcomed British 
support in an information war waged against Communist China. However, 
cooperation between London and New Delhi in the propaganda field quickly 
evaporated. British information officers attempted to work with Indian officials to 
address concerns that China’s propagandists were outmanoeuvring New Delhi, but 
policy implementation on the ground was often muddled and ineffective. It lacked 
strategic coherence and cut across the grain of an Indian prohibition on propaganda 
operations directed against the Soviet Union. From the late 1950s, an increase in 
tension between Moscow and Beijing, which would culminate in the Sino-Soviet 
split, provided New Delhi with a powerful strategic rationale for courting the USSR’s 
favour. The British Government’s position that Soviet propaganda represented the 
greater long-term threat to India, led to a diminution in the UK information effort 
expended on China, and to New Delhi feeling unsupported. In this policy context, the 
British found it difficult to implement a coherent and integrated propaganda 
campaign in India. 
Between 1954 and 1962, a long-simmering border dispute between India and 
China saw bilateral relations deteriorate from a position of peaceful co-existence and 
mutual amity to a state of open hostility and war. Propaganda became an important 
element in the Sino-Indian conflict, and New Delhi’s passive and reactive 
information policy saw India flounder in a battle for hearts and minds. In Whitehall, 
British officials judged that their Indian colleagues failed to fully comprehend the 
	 4	
power of propaganda as an instrument of warfare. As we shall see, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), which oversaw British policy in South Asia, 
and the Foreign Office (FO), which supervised covert information operations, 
responded to the Sino-Indian War by intensifying the United Kingdom’s propaganda 
effort in the subcontinent. 3  Britain’s propagandists provided expert advice and 
material support to the Indian government. However, London’s plans to exploit the 
Sino-Indian border war to discredit Soviet as well as Chinese communism in South 
Asia met strong local resistance.  
This article explores three themes. Primarily, it offers the first detailed archival 
account of work undertaken by the Information Research Department in India. The 
new evidence presented demonstrates that, as during other campaigns mounted to 
counter political ideology overseas, British authorities sanctioned illegal and high-
risk operations to undermine local communist support. In doing so, this article 
situates the IRD both within its broader Whitehall context and in relation to political 
activity conducted in India. Regarding the former, it advances the argument that 
impetus for controversial British operations was not confined to London and upper 
echelons of the so-called secret state. Stimulus for covert propaganda also came from 
British outposts abroad and the diplomats tasked with upholding the United 
Kingdom’s interests. With regard to the latter theme, it broadens existing 
understandings of British psychological operations in India by revealing the hidden 
hand of the IRD. 
Secondly, this article seeks to examine British conceptualisations of propaganda 
within former colonial territories, and unattributable propaganda more specifically. It 
advances existing understandings of the IRD beyond its role in an East-West binary. 
Comparatively little attention has been given to the Department’s impact inside an 
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expanding community of non-aligned nations during an era of decolonization. There 
has been some excellent scholarship published on the IRD’s foreign and domestic 
activity.4 Comparatively little attention, however, has been given to IRD operations 
overseas within former British colonial possessions. Carruthers, and Lashmar and 
Oliver, have undertaken path-breaking studies examining IRD interventions in 
Indonesia, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland. However, these have been framed 
predominantly in a counter-insurgency context.5 North American scholars, including 
Eric Pullin and Jason Parker, have interrogated the work of the United States’ Cold 
War propaganda agencies in South Asia. 6  This article breaks new ground by 
demonstrating the place of British information strategy in the subcontinent during the 
early years of the Cold War, thereby contributing a new dimension to broader studies 
of British diplomacy in India.  
Thirdly, some consideration is given to the extent to which Whitehall’s overseas 
information policy underestimated the power of local agency and exaggerated the 
impact of external influence. There is evidence that British propaganda strategy was 
predicated on a series of stereotypes about leadership and organisational attributes in 
Indian society, and overstated the effectiveness of local elites as agents of British 
influence. Diplomatic historians have utilised state archives to advance broad 
strategic explanations for the formulation and implementation of national interests. 
However, such archives also lend support to arguments presented most prominently 
in Edward Said’s Orientalism, that the West fashioned a broadly negative image of 
the East as a counterpoint to positive conceptions of Occidental values.7 This article 
suggests that Britain officials demonstrated orientalist traits in formulating their 
approach to unattributable propaganda in South Asia. More work is needed to fully 
substantiate the case that orientalism shaped British propaganda policy in the 
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subcontinent. Nonetheless, prominent British officials were predisposed to ‘save’ the 
‘vast, immature and half-educated’ Indian intelligentsia from the kind of ‘woolly 
minded’ thinking that constituted ‘easy prey’ for communist propaganda.8 Indians 
saw matters rather differently. 
 
I. 
 
In a bureaucratic or political framework, propaganda assumes three principal forms: 
white, grey, and black. White propaganda is undertaken openly with State support 
apparent and declared. It seldom incorporates material obtained from covert 
intelligence sources. The negative and manipulative associations attached to the term 
‘propaganda’ meant that it was invariably presented by official British agencies as 
publicity work. This propaganda represented the mainstay of the propaganda effort 
undertaken in India by the British Information Service (BIS) and the British Council. 
Keeping India out of the communist-bloc represented a ‘cardinal point’ of post-war 
British foreign policy. In pursuit of this objective, overt British information agencies 
in the subcontinent, as one prominent British high commissioner in India, Sir 
Archibald Nye, underlined, came to represent ‘the spearhead of our [Britain’s] attack 
on Communism.’9  
Throughout Asia, the IRD maintained close co-operation with overt British 
information organisations. In large part, this intimate relationship was driven by an 
acceptance inside IRD that the impact of its anti-communist material would be 
maximised only if it were juxtaposed with pro-Western publicity work undertaken by 
BIS and the British Council. In November 1951, the Cabinet Overseas Information 
Committee noted, ‘…experience shows that negative propaganda fails largely of [sic] 
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its effect unless it is accompanied by at least as great a volume of positive material, 
that is to say, material showing what is going on in the Western democracies and 
what hopes their example offers to the world.’14  
In India, successive directors of the BIS, beginning with W. F. King in the early 
1950s, cultivated strong and effective liaison arrangements with IRD colleagues.16 
Equally, having worked hard to establish its reputation as an organisation 
‘remarkably free of the propaganda stigma which attaches to certain other foreign 
information agencies’, and the United States Information Agency, in particular, the 
BIS determined not to compromise its effectiveness by becoming openly associated 
with ‘blatant, overt, or covert anti-Communist propaganda activity.’ The BIS was 
prepared to make ‘effective and discreet use’ of the IRD’s services. It was also 
painfully aware of the risks that working with the IRD entailed. ‘One false move,’ 
British officials acknowledged, ‘could undo the work of years.’17 
Grey and black propaganda is more covert and opaque. In both instances, 
government involvement is elided. Use of grey propaganda, which constituted the 
mainstay of IRD activity in India, focuses on the dissemination of unattributable 
information. This was often derived from ‘open sources’, or publicly available 
information harvested from newspapers, journals, books, and the broadcast media on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain. Such propaganda was largely factual, although 
carefully crafted to promote a specific political agenda. It frequently manifested in 
government officials co-opting journalists and publishers to replay favourable 
material.  
British propaganda work in South Asia was rooted in well-established imperial 
traditions that under the Raj had seen colonial officials cultivate the support of 
opinion formers. As scholars such as Chandrika Kaul have demonstrated, the 
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maintenance of British rule in India hinged on securing and retaining the support of 
local partners which, in turn, necessitated employing a pliant Anglo-Indian press to 
extoll the merits of empire and dampen nationalist sentiment. 18  The British 
discovered, however, that the power of the media does not correspond directly to the 
power of the message. From the 1930s, a nationalist press in the subcontinent that 
promoted a compelling narrative of swaraj, or independence, began to override the 
power of state propaganda.19 Three decades later, British officials would encounter 
similar resistance when asking sceptical Indians to prioritise considerations of Cold 
War ideology over more immediate and pressing matters of national security.  
Black propaganda, which involves influencing a target audience by means of 
deception or disinformation, is more complex and contentious, and carries a greater 
risk of ‘blowback’, or unintended and negative results. It is employed far less often 
than the white or grey varieties. At times, the IRD was involved in all three shades of 
propaganda in the Indian subcontinent. The focus of this article, however, is on the 
grey type that accounted for the majority of the time and effort invested by the 
Information Research Department in Cold War India. 
 
II. 
 
Before examining IRD activity in the subcontinent, it is necessary to consider the 
wider political context in which a Foreign Office department concerned with 
combating Cold War communist propaganda came to be employed in non-aligned 
India. The Information Research Department was established at the end of February 
1948, principally to counteract the siren call of communism amongst post-war 
western European states struggling to impose a degree of social and economic 
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cohesion. At an early stage, it was envisaged that IRD’s work would grow to 
encompass a wider geographical remit, and ‘require special application in the Middle 
East and Far Eastern countries.’21 Drawing some of its funds from the Secret Vote, or 
intelligence and secret services budget, under the leadership of Ralph Murray, who 
had served in the Political Warfare Executive during the Second World War, the IRD 
rapidly built-up a broad network of contacts, or clients, amongst politicians, 
government officials, journalists, and trade unionists, both at home and abroad.  
The IRD’s terms of reference expanded considerably during the 1950s, and came 
to include operations directed at an extensive range of threats to Britain’s strategic 
interests. At times, the Department was tasked with undermining pan-Arab 
nationalism, and put to work disrupting troublesome political regimes overseas, 
including that of President Sukarno in Indonesia.22 Regional information offices were 
established in the Middle East and Asia, and set to work harmonizing British covert 
propaganda. At its zenith, in the mid-1960s, the IRD’s London headquarters 
employed over 350 staff in geographical sections covering South East Asia, China, 
Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Soviet Union.23  
Within India, the IRD benefited from residual British information networks that 
had remained active until the very end of colonial rule in 1947. During the Second 
World War, the British mounted extensive covert propaganda operations in the 
subcontinent. Notably, the Viceroy of India, the Marquess of Linlithgow, utilised the 
Special Operations Executive (SOE), a clandestine warfare unit formed in 1940, in an 
effort to dampen nationalist sentiment, chiefly by placing unattributable articles 
supportive of Britain and the Allied war effort in vernacular newspapers.24 Once the 
British had hauled down the Union Jack and departed from South Asia, India 
continued to matter in the corridors of Whitehall. Not least, in an era of European 
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decolonisation, the British government valued India’s status as a prominent and 
moderating influence within the Afro-Asian Non-Aligned Movement.  
Equally, the latent economic and military potential of India’s hundreds-of-millions 
of citizens was seen as a valuable Cold War prize. As the world’s largest democracy, 
India was viewed in London as an indispensable bulwark against the expansion of 
communism in Asia. After October 1949, India’s currency as a beacon of Asian 
democracy increased substantially, when Mao Zedong’s communists defeated their 
nationalist opponents and proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC). At the 
time, one British official in India emphasised that, ‘there are two Capitals in the East 
which are assuming more and more importance, namely Peking and New Delhi, as 
here are to be found the governments who between them control the destinies of 
almost two-thirds of the total Asian population.’25  
British anxiety at the external communist threat posed to India by the emergence 
of the PRC, was matched by concern at the nation’s vulnerability to internal 
communist subversion. In 1948, the Communist Party of India (CPI) launched an 
armed insurgency centred on Telegana, in the south of the country. The Indian Army 
and the nation’s security services managed to suppress the insurrection, which 
claimed over two thousand lives. By February 1950, India’s communists had 
abandoned political violence and shifted to a strategy of seeking power through the 
ballot box.29 Over the following decade, the left-leaning Congress Party of India’s 
premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, dominated national politics. It was a rejuvenated CPI, 
however, that emerged as the Congress Party’s principal electoral rival. A strong 
party organisation, ideological cachet amongst India’s intelligentsia, and a generally 
left-of-centre political climate inside the subcontinent, all combined to make the 
Communists appear respectable and electable. In 1957, the communist share of the 
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vote in that year’s Indian general election peaked at 9 per cent. More significantly, 
electors in the southern Indian state of Kerala became the first anywhere in the world 
to freely return a communist administration.30  
Concurrently, the Indian government’s decision to reinforce national security and 
boost economic development through closer and more constructive relations with its 
Chinese and Soviet neighbours, unsettled Whitehall. In October 1954, a state visit 
paid by Nehru to China paved the way for a Sino-Indian Treaty on Trade and 
Intercourse with Tibet, which incorporated the Panch Sheel, or Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence. This committed India and China to uphold policies of mutual 
non-aggression; to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; to eschew 
interference in each other’s domestic affairs; and, to pursue policies of peaceful 
coexistence. The treaty was also notable as the instrument under which India 
formally relinquished its ancient claim to special rights and privileges in Tibet.33 
 The flowering of Sino-Indian relations that followed, brought with it an increase 
in the amount and variety of Communist Chinese literature circulating in India. In 
March 1955, one BIS report grumbled that Indians appeared to be entirely 
unconcerned at the influx of communist propaganda entering the country across their 
northern border. ‘There continues to be wide and enthusiastic reception for Chinese 
propaganda [in India] even at the highest levels,’ one exasperated BIS officer 
observed, ‘and a great deal more at the lower.’34 Chinese propaganda was deemed 
‘particularly effective’ by the British, as it focused on communist successes in 
combating problems all too familiar to most Indians, and chiefly those surrounding 
agrarian reform, endemic poverty, and petty corruption. Moreover, BIS analysis 
concluded that Chinese communist propaganda retained currency, and was ‘widely 
acceptable’ to Indians, because it originated from a nation that was ‘held up as the 
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spearhead of Asian resurgence.’ Beijing’s propagandists were considered equally 
adept at ‘deliberately exploiting’ racial themes that touched on raw nerves in India, 
and which cast Britain and the United States in particular, as exploitative agents of 
“white imperialism.”35  
It was the inroads being made by Soviet propaganda in India, however, that 
proved of paramount concern in London. In 1955, an exchange of state visits between 
Nehru and the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, invigorated New Delhi’s 
previously moribund relationship with Moscow. Soviet economic aid to India 
boomed. Politically, the Soviets garnered Indian goodwill by throwing their weight 
behind New Delhi’s position on the disputed state of Kashmir within the UN Security 
Council. In the cultural sphere, Soviet film festivals became a regular feature of 
Indian life; troupes of travelling Russian entertainers cross-crossed the country; the 
TASS news agency set up shop in Delhi; and heavily subsidised Soviet literature 
featured prominently on the shelves of Indian bookstores.36  
Prominent Indians sympathetic to the West, such as the socialist turned 
conservative politician, Minocher Rustom ‘Minoo’ Masani, chastised Britain and the 
United States for doing ‘pathetically little’ to counter a proliferation of ‘fantastically 
cheap’ Soviet publications being ‘sold at every [Indian] street corner.’ In a single 
year, Masani noted, the Soviet People’s Publishing House, which had opened an 
office in Bombay, in western India, sold 300,000 discounted copies of the Life of 
Joseph Stalin. Prohibitively expensive British or American books on liberal political 
themes, such as Arthur Schlesinger’s Vital Center, struggled to run up Indian sales in 
excess of three figures. ‘The Soviet Government,’ Masani warned an American 
audience during a speech in Detroit, ‘is spending millions of rubles in India today to 
try and get the mind of the people on their side.’38 
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British officials in India attributed the success enjoyed by Soviet propaganda 
operations less to the inadequacies of local Western information activity, and more to 
New Delhi’s supposed lassitude in confronting an insidious communist pincer 
movement that targeted the nation’s social system from above and below. Faced with 
what the British considered to be a clear and present danger to state sovereignty, 
Indian officials were lambasted in Whitehall as evidencing a troublingly complacent 
and apathetic attitude to communism. Back in 1948, Alec Symon, Britain’s deputy 
high commissioner, had lamented that India’s intelligence chief,  Tirupattur 
Gangadharam Sanjevi, ‘seems to regard the [Communist] movement as purely 
internal nuisance to be classed with any other political body in India and he shows no 
signs of regarding Communism as an international conspiracy aimed at Sovietization 
of Asia and the World.’40 A decade later, Whitehall remained perplexed at the Indian 
government’s benign view of Soviet foreign policy.  
The British conceded that, in fairness, Nehru’s administrations had taken a firm 
line with the CPI, arresting Indian communists suspected of inciting civil disorder or 
engaging in political agitation. Externally directed communist subversion, however, 
seemed of little concern to India’s national leadership. Indeed, it was the Pandora’s 
box of communalism, and the risk that religious tensions might fracture Indian unity, 
that preoccupied Nehru. ‘The danger to India ... is not communism,’ the Indian 
premier was fond of reminding his civil servants. ‘It is Hindu right-wing 
communalism.’41 In such circumstances, British policymakers deemed it to be self-
evident that London not only had a clear interest, but also an obligation, to save India 
from communism.  
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III. 
 
The IRD operation in India reached its zenith in the 1960s. As early as 1948, 
however, Christopher Mayhew, Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and a 
leading figure in the IRD’s creation, had begun working with colleagues in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office to strengthen the dissemination of unattributable 
anti-communist propaganda across South Asia.45 By the following year, the CRO had 
established effective mechanisms for forwarding IRD material on to the British High 
Commission in New Delhi and, in return, furnishing the IRD with intelligence on 
local communist publications. Senior British officials, including the high 
commissioner, Archibald Nye, found a ready market for the IRD’s anti-communist 
product among Indian colleagues. Haravu Venkatanarasimha Varadaraja Iengar, the 
Indian government’s Home Secretary, and the senior civil servant responsible for 
internal security, proved to be an avid consumer of IRD literature. 46  A former 
stalwart of the pre-independence British colonial administration, Iengar was 
categorised by Nye as ‘one of the ablest and most effective’ operatives in Nehru’s 
government and, more importantly, staunchly anti-communist.47 
It was British diplomats on the ground in India, Nye included, and not Whitehall 
Mandarins back at home, that cracked the propaganda whip hardest. In May 1951, the 
disgruntled high commissioner found cause to gripe to the CRO at the inadequate 
support his mission had received in the communist counter propaganda field. It had 
been over a year, Nye protested, since his staff had asked for IRD material targeted at 
India’s students and ‘semi-educated classes.’ Since then, Nye complained to Percival 
Liesching, Permanent Under-Secretary at the CRO, he had been fobbed off with 
assurances that ‘the matter [was] under consideration’ and that London was ‘hoping 
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to get something out soon.’ Underlining his concern in a separate missive dispatched 
to Patrick Gordon-Walker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Nye 
stated bluntly that, ‘half-hearted measures [in India] are…a waste of time and it is 
essential that the whole anti-Communist publicity campaign should be systematized 
and carried out with drive and energy if worth-while results are to be obtained.’ 48 
In London, the High Commissioner’s warning hit home. The CRO made sure that 
Nye’s successors, Alexander Clutterbuck and Malcolm MacDonald, benefited from 
the establishment of more direct lines of communication with the IRD. In 
consequence, the volume of IRD literature reaching India increased substantially 
during the 1950s, and began to reach ever-wider circles of ‘friendly’ British contacts 
within Nehru’s government; the ruling Congress party; the armed forces; the press; 
and academia.49 Not all IRD material dispatched to New Delhi hit the right note with 
its Indian audience. Much of IRD output that arrived in the subcontinent was of a 
generic anti-communist type, or based on examples of communist repression and 
tyranny drawn from Eastern Europe. Unsurprisingly, this proved of limited interest to 
Indian ‘customers’. IRD articles decrying the persecution of the Roman Catholic 
Church in Bulgaria, for example, vexed local British information staff. ‘Even the 
ablest Information Officer,’ the CRO was reminded, ‘cannot succeed in making a 
vital issue [of Bulgarian Catholicism] amongst his Indian contacts.’ 50  The 
propaganda offensive in India, Whitehall was chided, would benefit were IRD to cast 
‘a rather more critical and selective eye’ over the suitability of the publications it sent 
east of Suez.51 
The IRD responded to criticism from British information officers in the field, and 
quickly replaced the short, well-documented, and utilitarian briefing notes, or Basic 
Papers, that it sent to India, with a more appropriate range of materials designed to 
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pique the interest of local opinion formers. The Interpreter, a monthly publication, 
aimed at national elites, proved especially popular with Indian contacts. It was 
offered to senior Indian government officials on the pretext that it was a British 
foreign service document, and that recipients would be privy to inside information 
not usually shared outside Whitehall. Notable for its tight prose and methodical anti-
Communist analysis, the Interpreter featured an introduction not dissimilar to that of 
a broadsheet leader. Derived from the Interpreter, Asian Analyst proved another 
favourite with the IRD’s Indian clients. It focused specifically on developments 
inside China, on Soviet and Chinese foreign policy, and the insidious actions of 
communist parties across Asia. The stable of IRD publications in India also came to 
include the Digest series. This pulled together short, punchy anti-communist stories 
that were readily quotable, and appeared sufficiently topical to pass as news.52 In 
keeping with its status as a covert organisation, none of the IRD’s output carried a 
publisher’s imprint or was attributed to the British government. 
Refinements made to IRD output reaped immediate dividends in India. Notably, 
British  diplomats pulled off a significant coup by adding Bhola Nath Mullik to the 
distribution list for IRD material. In July 1950, Mullik had replaced Sanjevi as the 
head of India’s intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB). India’s spy chief 
proved to be an avid consumer of IRD product, and received personal copies of the 
Interpreter, Asian Analyst, Digest, and Trends in Communist Propaganda.53 Mullik 
was regarded as a particularly important asset by the IRD on account of his close 
personal relationship with Nehru, and his willingness to provide feedback on the type 
of propaganda material likely to resonate inside the Indian government. One British 
official noted that in developing counter-propaganda for Indian audiences, he had 
come to ‘think of the D.I.B. [Mullick] being the perfect point d’appui.’ 54 
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Unattributable research papers produced by the IRD and the Foreign Office Research 
Department (FORD) were even channelled through India’s Intelligence Bureau to 
other Indian government departments, in a process that enhanced the materials 
credibility immeasurably and further masked its British origin. ‘There is evidence,’ 
British officials crowed, ‘that much of this [IRD literature] is read by Mr Nehru 
himself. By Sir N.R. Pillai [Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs 
(MEA) and Cabinet Secretary] and by the Home Secretary (Mr Pai).’55  
Moreover, the connection formed between the IRD and India’s intelligence service 
delivered benefits beyond government. The Intelligence Bureau assisted the British in 
placing a steady flow of unattributable anti-communist material produced by the IRD 
in mainstream Indian newspapers.57 More broadly, as the 1950s came to a close, the 
British information officials in India expressed satisfaction that, ‘we have in fact been 
making good use vis-a-vis Indian officials, including Mullik, of the [IRD] material on 
this subject which has reached us…’ Whether such material was being digested by 
Nehru and his cabinet, and what effect, if any, it might have had on the Indian 
leaderships attitudes to the Soviet Union, and the danger posed by communist 
subversion, was, British officials conceded, ‘much harder to say.’58 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. 
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In the late summer of 1960, a change of British leadership in India, that saw Sir Paul 
Gore-Booth arrive in New Delhi as UK high commissioner, had a transformative 
effect on IRD operations in the subcontinent. On arriving in the Indian capital, Gore-
Booth was immediately struck by the ubiquity of Soviet propaganda, and quickly 
concluded that the IRD should be employed more aggressively to counter communist 
information activity.67 Wasting no time, in September, the new high commissioner 
asked the IRD to send one of its officers out to India to review Britain’s counter-
propaganda operation. Between March and April 1961, Josephine O’Connor Howe, 
who had earned a formidable reputation within the IRD for efficiency and directness, 
set to work on a root and branch assessment of the Department’s activity.68  
When O’Connor Howe’s report landed on Gore-Booth’s desk, it identified the 
British propaganda problem in India as one of weak and ineffective co-ordination 
between information agencies. Specifically, the covert anti-communist activity 
undertaken by the IRD, and the overt and ‘positive’ output celebrating liberal 
democracy and free enterprise that underpinned BIS’ work, were deemed to be 
insufficiently integrated and complementary. To rectify matters, O’Connor-Howe 
argued for the deployment of a permanent IRD officer to work alongside BIS 
colleagues in New Delhi.71 The IRD had been exploring ways of stationing ‘field 
officers’ overseas for some time. An escalation in Cold War tension at the beginning 
of the decade, following clashes between the Soviet Union and the United States over 
a range of issues from Cuba to Berlin, saw the IRD’s role in combatting communist 
subversion acquire renewed currency in Whitehall. The Department’s funding 
increased. It recruited additional staff. And, for the first time, the IRD found itself in 
a position to place its officers in British diplomatic missions overseas.72  
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By the end of 1962, twenty-five IRD field officers had been posted abroad. Their 
remit was to report on local communist activity; procure examples of communist 
propaganda; distribute IRD literature; and cultivate contacts willing to receive and 
disseminate IRD product. Two years later, the Department had over fifty staff serving 
across the globe.73 India’s status as a British foreign policy priority, allied to Gore-
Booth’s push for a more active IRD role in the subcontinent, ensured that New Delhi 
was placed at the forefront of the field officer initiative. In January 1962, Peter Joy, 
the first IRD officer posted to India, arrived in South Asia.  
Operating covertly, and without the knowledge of the Indian government, 
ostensibly Joy’s role was that of a publications officer in the BIS.74 Initially, he 
struggled to expand the IRD’s network of local contacts. Reluctant to compromise 
India’s policy of Cold War non-alignment, and anxious to retain Soviet economic and 
political support, many officials in Nehru’s government shied away from 
involvement in overtly anti-communist activity that was likely to antagonise 
Moscow. With the assistance of British information staff based in Bombay, Calcutta, 
and Madras, Joy embarked upon the ‘slow and laborious’ task of recruiting Indians to 
disseminate unattributable IRD material on a confidential basis. By the late summer 
of 1962, following months of hard work, he had acquired 60 Indian contacts, each of 
which was graded in terms of their individual influence and reliability.75 
In October, the IRD’s luck in India changed decisively for the better. That month, 
a border dispute between India and China that had smouldered since the end of the 
previous decade, erupted into open hostilities. The brief and bloody Sino-Indian 
border war saw India suffer a humiliating military defeat at the hands of its 
communist neighbour.76 In Whitehall, British officials were as disconcerted at the 
ease with which China managed to outflank India in propaganda terms, as they were 
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with events on the battlefield. The ‘absolute consistency’ with which Beijing 
presented itself to international audiences as a victim of Indian aggression, one 
Foreign Office official observed, contrasted unfavourably with New Delhi’s 
‘wavering and often self-contradictory’ performance in the publicity sphere.77  
The British Information Service expressed grudging admiration for the manner in 
which Radio Peking’s English Service had shown itself to be ‘highly skilled’ in 
selectively quoting from the public statements of Indian leaders to portray its 
adversary as a belligerent warmonger. In a media operation that the BIS noted had 
‘“out-Goebbels Goebbels”’, Chinese state radio utilised the services of an Irishman 
‘slightly reminiscent of Lord Haw Haw’, who returned to the theme of Indian 
aggression, ‘so repetitively that something must certainly stick in the minds of 
Asian/African listeners, if not of other peoples also.’78 The British were especially 
concerned at the lack of sympathy and understanding that India had garnered in the 
developing world following the onset of the Sino-Indian border war. An apparent 
indifference to India’s plight amongst the nations of Africa and Asia was attributed, 
in part, to the imperious manner in which Nehru’s governments had conducted much 
of their diplomacy since 1947. Gore-Booth suggested that the border war had 
demonstrated to Indians that, ‘if you want goodwill from people in critical moments, 
you must not spend the rest of your time either ignoring them or loftily criticising the 
management of their affairs.’79  
The scale of India’s military reversal at the hands of the Chinese served to amplify 
a disposition amongst Britain’s foreign service officers and propagandists, at home 
and abroad, to deny agency to their Indian colleagues, and to disparage the Indian 
government’s association with non-alignment and non-violence. British officials 
invariably portrayed their Indian counterparts as weak, naïve, and passive victims, 
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who required external direction to function effectively. Indeed, the paternalistic 
language and imperious tone employed by British diplomats at the time of the Sino-
Indian War offers evidence in support of Said’s critique of Orientalism. Whitehall’s 
missions across the globe took a perverse sense of pleasure in India’s predicament. 
Behind closed doors, British expressions of schadenfreude were couched in language 
that betrayed a thinly veiled sense of condescension towards, ‘the inadequate public 
presentation… of the Indian case in regard to the frontier dispute with China.’80 
At the very top of the British government, the Conservative prime minister, Harold 
Macmillan, reflected acidly that having suffered ‘a bit of a Dunkirk’ at the hands of 
China and been exposed to the harsh realities of power-politics, Nehru had assumed 
a, ‘different tone from that [previously] adopted by the protagonist of non-resistance 
and “non-alignment.” India’s leader, the British premier observed caustically, 
appeared to have undergone a transformation from ‘an imitation of George Lansbury 
into a parody of Churchill.’81 With obvious distaste, Macmillan confided to American 
officials that the Sino-Indian war would compel his government to assist, ‘people 
[Indians] who for 12 years or more have attacked us ... like a camel looking down his 
nose at you’.82 Macmillan’s attitude was replicated across Whitehall. Having been 
recalled to London for talks in the wake of the border clash, Ronald Belcher, 
Britain’s deputy high commissioner in India, returned to the subcontinent with, ‘the 
impression ... of everyone’s disliking and distrusting India – to such a degree that it 
seemed there was a danger of emotion being allowed more hand than reason in 
swaying our policies’. Belcher’s discomfort at the level of anti-Indian sentiment in 
London was such, that he felt compelled to remind the CRO that ‘the present 
Government of India’s undoubtedly irritating characteristics of stubbornness and 
ungratefulness’ ought not obscure the fact that Britain should offer India support 
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‘because it is in our own interest to do it.’83 
Further afield, British representatives in Africa and Asia proved to be equally 
critical of India. In Mali, in West Africa, the British ambassador, Martin Le Quesne, 
expressed exasperation at the degree to which local Indian officials had meekly 
surrendered the propaganda initiative to China. Le Quesne advised Whitehall that the 
response of Indian envoys in Africa to the border conflict was ‘wet’ and defeatist. 
The Indian ambassador to Ghana, London was informed, ‘agree[d] wholeheartedly 
that the Indians had failed to play the good cards in their hand and had let the Chinese 
take all the tricks, but seemed to regard this as being the natural order of things. One 
of those unfortunate facts of life about which nothing could be done.’ 84  British 
representatives in Asia were equally critical in their assessments of India’s 
performance in the information arena. In Indonesia, the British embassy in Djakarta 
reported that India’s ambassador, Apa Pant, was ‘almost at his wits’ end’ in trying to 
counter Indonesians’ willingness to accept China’s version of the border war. ‘Seen 
from here,’ the Djakarta embassy judged, ‘the Chinese have carried out an entirely 
successful propaganda exercise designed to fog and bemuse uninformed and semi-
informed opinion. Their official statement at the outset of the fighting were almost 
automatically taken at face value here and the first impression thus created has not 
been weakened seriously by anything said or done by the Indians since.’85  
Exasperated by India’s ineffectual attempts at influencing global opinion, the 
Foreign Office concluded starkly that, ‘the Chinese are much better at propaganda 
than the Indian…’ The Nehru government’s mishandling of the information 
dimension of the Sino-Indian war, as much as the military calamity that it came to 
represent, was taken as validation by British officials that Indians more generally 
were unsuited and ill-equipped to manage a modern conflict in which propaganda and 
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psychological warfare capabilities were of critical importance. In simple terms, the 
British reasoned that New Delhi did, ‘not know how to put their case across … and it 
looks as if it is going to take them a long time to learn how to do it.’ 86 The 
organisation and operational effectiveness of India’s publicity and information 
machinery certainly left much to be desired. Yet, Britain’s approach to the Sino-
Indian war in general, and India’s information performance more specifically, was 
also undoubtedly informed by paternalist sentiment. Put simply, the British viewed 
their former Indian colony as a more passive and less dynamic nation than 
Communist China. Earlier in 1962, when referencing disparities in the relative 
economic performance of the two states, one Foreign Office official articulated a 
criticism of India that was aired all too frequently in the corridors of Whitehall. The 
road to modernity depended above all, the British argument went, on mobilizing the 
will and energy of the people, and whilst ‘that upsurge of will and energy is certainly 
manifest in China: it does not yet seem to be very evident in India.’87 
Harold Macmillan’s government accepted that extending some form of British 
support to India in its conflict with China, whatever Whitehall’s distaste for Nehru’s 
foreign policymaking, was politically unavoidable. The British cabinet nevertheless 
bridled at committing its limited national economic and military resources to defend 
India. Strategically overextended prior to the onset of Sino-Indian hostilities, Britain 
recoiled from the prospect of becoming enmeshed in a shooting war with China that 
threatened disaster for its international interests and, above all, those in Hong Kong. 
Furnishing India with expertise and advice in the information realm offered London a 
means to assist New Delhi at little cost and minimal risk. 88  Accordingly, when 
meeting with Nehru in November 1962, Duncan Sandys, Macmillan’s Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, emphasised Britain’s willingness ‘to help the 
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Indians in every way in the presentation of their case [on the border war].’ Noting 
that the UK had ‘a considerably developed network of Information Services’, Sandys 
confirmed to the Indian premier that London would ‘be very glad’ to work with his 
government in countering Chinese propaganda.89   
In offering India the benefit of British expertise in counter-propaganda operations, 
Sandys was pushing against an open door. The Sino-Indian conflict found Indian 
government ministries, journalists, and research centres, clamouring for material on 
the inequities of Communist China, which Peter Joy and the IRD were only too 
willing to supply. As a first step, a newly formulated Indian government committee 
for ‘War Information and Counter-Propaganda’, that included representation from the 
IB, MEA, All-India Radio, and the Press Information Bureau, requested assistance 
from the BIS, which continued to act as cover for the IRD’s undeclared operations in 
India. Extra copies of the IRD’s stock publications on Chinese communism, 
including China Topics and China Records, were rushed out to the subcontinent to 
meet a welcome surge in Indian demand. A special supplement of the Asian Analyst 
was produced that addressed purported Chinese treachery in respect of the border 
conflict. A direct airmail service was established between the IRD’s London office 
and the High Commission in New Delhi. This allowed the IRD to supply its Indian 
contacts with timely extracts from anti-Indian and pro-Chinese public statements 
made by communist leaders and their governments. The airmail service was also 
utilised to feed Nehru’s administration with copies of disparaging quotations 
attributed to Chinese officials in which the Indian premier and members of his 
cabinet were the subject of personal abuse. In fact, such slanderous material 
originated with MI6, Britain’s foreign intelligence service, who passed it on to news 
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agencies in the Far East that were covertly funded by London, in a classic black 
propaganda operation.90 
As 1962 drew to a close, the Indian government provided Britain’s propagandists 
with a green light to pass on as much anti-Chinese material as they could to ‘the 
appropriate official [Indian government] bodies – and indeed to non-official 
organisations if we [Britain] wished.’ The sole limitation placed by Indian officials 
upon an unprecedented invitation extended to British colleagues to disseminate 
counter-propaganda material inside and outside government channels, was that such 
work remain confined, ‘to China and Chinese activities in view of the continued 
official ban on propaganda against the Soviet Union or Communism as such.’91 
Nehru’s government had no interest in exploiting the Sino-Indian war to turn Indians 
against communism more broadly. Having become embroiled in an enervating 
conflict with one of its communist neighbours, New Delhi was resolute in its 
determination to avoid antagonising another.92    
Indeed, from the end of the 1950s, Soviet reluctance to censure New Delhi, as 
India’s relations with Beijing turned increasingly sour, acted as a catalyst for the 
Sino-Soviet schism, and provided Nehru’s government with ample reason to cultivate 
Moscow’s goodwill. A bitter rancour developed tween the Soviet Union and the PRC 
over the latter’s management of its relationship with India, in the wake of unrest in 
Tibet, armed clashes between Indian and Chinese border guards, and the flight of the 
Dalai Lama to the subcontinent. In turn, the Sino-Indian dispute was transformed into 
a vehicle for the expression of broader differences between Moscow and Beijing over 
how the Cold War should be waged. Barbed exchanges between Soviet and Chinese 
officials over the merits of peaceful co-existence and how best to advance socialism 
in non-aligned India, resulted in accusations of disloyalty, opportunism and bad faith. 
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With hostile states in the form of China and Pakistan astride India’s northern, eastern, 
and western borders, the division between New Delhi’s communist neighbours suited 
its strategic interests, and provided a compelling reason for avoiding encirclement by 
courting Moscow’s favour.93  
The Indian government’s aversion to anti-Soviet propaganda aside, Peter Joy 
found reason to express cautious optimism that the border war would rebound to the 
IRD’s advantage. Principally, it seemed likely that a growth in Indian demand for 
IRD publications would continue unabated into the future. Nevertheless, Joy was 
careful to inject a note of circumspection in his reports back to London. The IRD 
officer cautioned colleagues that, in the immediate term at least, the political climate 
in the subcontinent was only receptive to counter-propaganda, ‘related to India’s 
problems [with China] and not straight anti-Communist propaganda which would not 
be acceptable in India.’ Whitehall found Joy’s assessment of the new counter-
propaganda environment in India that had been opened-up by the border war to be 
excessively pessimistic. Convinced that Indians, with appropriate guidance, could be 
cajoled to recognise the danger represented by Soviet as well as Chinese subversion, 
senior IRD officers evidenced a bullishness more redolent of colonial administrators 
than post-colonial partners. China’s actions had, it was held, presented ‘a chance of 
securing a major “break-through” for I.R.D. work in India.’94 At a minimum, it was 
anticipated that the assistance the IRD provided to New Delhi in the propaganda field 
would ‘cement our good relations with the Government of India for a long time to 
come.’95  
Under instruction from London, Joy began running a twin-track IRD operation in 
India. One strand, which was ‘virtually requested by the Indian authorities,’ saw the 
IRD support and develop the Indian government’s counter-propaganda capability in 
	 27	
respect of China. In practical terms, this encompassed work that ranged from 
providing guidance and advice to Indian colleagues on the format and content of 
programming on All India Radio, to arranging for Indian information officers to 
attend propaganda and psychological warfare courses back in the UK.96 One IRD 
radio script entitled, China’s Withdrawal Appraised, was broadcast almost verbatim 
on the AIR programme, India and the Dragon.97 The MEA’s China division went as 
far as to solicit British input on semi-classified Indian government documents 
covering the border conflict and the Sino-Soviet dispute. This development, Peter Joy 
enthused optimistically, had enabled political officers within the British high 
commission, ‘to encourage a dialogue [with Indian colleagues] on future Chinese and 
Communist bloc policy which may in time provide us with opportunities for 
influencing official thinking in this field.’98  
Some disquiet did surface within the IRD that by collaborating with the Indian 
government on counter-propaganda work directed exclusively at China, the 
shortcomings of Soviet communism would be elided. ‘To some extent,’ the IRD 
conceded, an over emphasis on China ‘…helps the Russians to do their jobs for 
them.’ Specifically, the Department worried that by directing too much British 
expertise and resources in the propaganda field on presenting China as a militant, 
aggressive, and expansionist state, ‘many Indians may be reinforced in their 
assumption that Soviet Communism is “liberal” in comparison with the Chinese 
brand.’ Persuading Indians of Beijing ill-intent was, after all, the British reasoned, 
essentially a case of ‘preaching to the converted.’ More positively, the IRD drew 
some comfort from the goodwill that Peter Joy’s efforts had generated toward Britain 
inside the Indian government. Moreover, an increase in anti-Chinese publicity in the 
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subcontinent was likely, the IRD anticipated, to have ‘replay value’ beyond India’s 
borders, and produce ‘generally anti-communist “fall-out” across Asia.99 
A second, unofficial strand of the IRD’s India operation, continued to disseminate 
counter-propaganda material aimed at the Soviet Union, and operated without the 
knowledge and approval of the Indian government. Although frustrated by the 
embargo imposed by Nehru’s administration on propaganda activity with an anti-
Soviet tinge, the IRD had little option other than to acknowledge the political 
boundaries imposed by realities on the ground. ‘Russia’s position in India excludes 
our close liaison with the Government in countering Communist subversion,’ a senior 
IRD officer acknowledged, ‘and our effort must be concerned primarily with alerting 
unofficial… opinion to the threat rather than with liaison in countering it.’100 The 
‘unofficial’ Soviet element of IRD activity in India continued to be seen by the 
Department as ‘much more important’ in the long-term than its ‘official’ Chinese 
programme. Consequently, the ‘main effort’ undertaken by Peter Joy remained 
concentrated upon the, ‘infinitely more difficult tasks of weaning Indians away from 
the idea that the Soviet Union’s dispute with China has transformed it into India’s 
“guardian angel” in the Sino-Indian dispute, and that the aims and methods of Soviet 
Communism are, in some way, different in kind from those of the Chinese.’101   
In electing to prioritize counter-propaganda operations in India that targeted the 
Soviet Union, the IRD faced an uphill task. In February 1957, having concluded that 
the previous year’s Hungarian crisis had shown its propaganda capabilities to be 
lagging behind those of the West, the Central Committee of the Soviet Presidium 
approved an expansion in the volume and reach of propaganda aimed at the 
developing world. The budget of the Soviet Ministry of Communications was 
boosted, and Radio Moscow was provided with new and more powerful transmitters 
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directed at Asia, Latin America and Africa. The quantity of Soviet literature available 
in the Indian subcontinent increased exponentially. One Soviet publication alone, the 
fortnightly magazine, Soviet Land, came to be distributed in India in fourteen 
languages, and had a circulation of 300,000 by the early 1960s.102 
The ‘formidable Communist bloc effort in the Information field’ in India came to 
encompass an ever-expanding cultural programme of Soviet films, exhibitions, and 
lectures. The India-Soviet Cultural Society (ISCUS) operated a national network of 
branches and affiliates that sponsored communist libraries and reading rooms. 
Novosti, the Soviets ‘unofficial’ press agency, opened a bureau in New Delhi. A 
second Soviet front organisation, Inter-Ads, subsidised communist newspapers and 
journals by channelling spurious advertising revenue in their direction. At the same 
time, the aftermath of the border war witnessed an increase in indigenous communist 
propaganda carried by left-wing Indian newspapers, such as Blitz, Patriot, Link and 
Mainstream, and amongst workers organisations linked to the CPI, including the All 
India Trade Union Congress.103 One Soviet intelligence officer, who served in the 
KGB residency, or station, in New Delhi, during this period, subsequently confirmed 
that in waging a propaganda war against the West, full use was made of, ‘extensive 
contacts within [Indian] political parties, among journalists and public organizations. 
All were enthusiastically brought into play.’104  
The absence of Indian government support for the IRD’s ‘unofficial’ counter-
propaganda effort directed against the Soviet Union, failed to prevent Peter Joy from 
expanding the operations scope and scale. Joy pressed ahead and established a 
network numbering some 400 Indian contacts, or ‘well placed and influential 
individuals’, who received IRD material and assisted in its dissemination.105 In 1964, 
the enterprising IRD officer forged relationships with two Indian publishers, Gopal 
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Mittal, owner of the National Academy Publishing House in New Delhi, and Ram 
Singh, a journalist on the Hindustan Times, editor of the right-wing magazine 
Thought, and manager of the Siddharta publishing group.106 Mittal and Singh went on 
to become mainstays of Britain’s counter propaganda offensive against Soviet 
communism in India. Each covertly distributed IRD literature under payment of a 
financial subsidy. Mittal’s company, in particular, printed and distributed books with 
anti-communist themes throughout the subcontinent in English, Hindi, Urdu, and 
Tamil editions, the texts of which were supplied by the IRD. Under the terms of a 
‘see-safe’ agreement, the IRD paid Mittal a subsidy that covered publication and 
distribution expenses, and ensured that his business returned a healthy profit from its 
association with Britain’s covert propagandists. The scheme, which by the spring of 
1967 had seen 70,000 books gifted to key IRD contacts, or sold at below market 
prices, cost the British taxpayer upwards of £10,000 per annum.107  
Joy subsequently expanded IRD operations in India to encompass an article 
redistribution scheme. In collaboration with Gopal Mittal, whose publishing interests 
included ownership of a prominent Urdu magazine, Tehreek, Joy arranged for IRD 
copy to be translated into a range of vernacular languages and passed on to journalists 
working at Indian newspapers and magazines. In theory, the scheme enabled the IRD 
to react quickly to breaking news, and to reach Indian audiences with topical anti-
communist material. On average, however, the scheme placed just two articles a 
month in Indian newspapers, at an annual cost of £1,500. At the time, India’s 
thousands of newspapers and periodicals had a combined circulation of 30 million 
readers.108 The meagre output of the article redistribution scheme was justified by Joy 
on the basis that the news stories it produced invariably resulted in similar copy being 
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carried by other news organisations and, as such, ‘it seems to us good value for 
money.’109 
The IRD’s inability to quantify precisely how much replay its articles received in 
the Indian media suggested, however, that the value for money argument was based 
less on cold hard facts, and more on professional wishful thinking. Less regulated 
arrangements were subsequently put in place to distribute IRD news items through 
other Indian publishers with links to local and national media, including Sagar 
Ahluwalia, editor of Young Asia Publications, and Professor A. B. Shah, of the 
Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom. The diverse web of publishing contacts 
established in India, IRD officers crowed, enabled the Department, ‘…to get the right 
article into the right paper at the right time.’110 
The perception inside Whitehall that the IRD was making headway against the 
Soviet information offensive in India, enabled Joy to lobby successfully for the 
allocation of additional counter-propaganda resources. For some time, Joy had 
complained that the IRD operation in India was over-stretched, under-resourced, and, 
in consequence, ‘dependent on a pathetically small network of reliable contacts in 
New Delhi and the [regional British] posts.’ In May 1964, gripes over the difficulties 
in making and ‘nursing’ Indian contacts in a vast country subject to an increasing 
weight of Soviet propaganda were addressed, in part, when a second IRD officer was 
posted to Delhi. Catherine Allen arrived in India as a ‘super PA’ to offer Joy much 
needed administrative support. It was as a successor to Allen, that a future head of 
MI5, Stella Rimington, was inducted into the ‘secret world’.111 Allen proved to be an 
exceptionally capable and enterprising officer. Even with additional assistance, 
however, Joy struggled with the logistical challenges of running a counter-
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propaganda programme within a nation renowned for its social, political, ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic plurality.  
Fieldtrips undertaken outside the Indian capital revealed that the IRD’s work 
missed its mark as often as it hit home. In Ranchi, in eastern India, one IRD contact, 
Sen Gupta, the editor of the local English language daily, New Republic, was 
discovered by Joy to be, ‘busily engaged in playing both the Soviet bloc off against 
the West in his own parish.’ A typical IRD contact, Gupta ran a small newspaper 
with insufficient staff or time to devote to sub-editing. As such, Gupta made more use 
of small features on topical issues supplied to him by the information department of 
the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, and rather less of relatively long-winded and 
abstruse IRD copy. Short one-page Soviet bulletins, written in plain language, and 
focusing on basic themes calculated to attract the attention of rural readers, such as 
Soviet medical, scientific, and agricultural advances, compared favourably with the 
‘far too sophisticated’ fare offered up by the IRD.112 Reliable and effective IRD 
contacts in Indian journalism and publishing were highly prized and, as Joy rued, ‘as 
scarce as gold dust!’113 Such, contacts, however, as Gupta candidly acknowledged, 
invariably proved indifferent to the political message contained within British and 
Soviet propaganda. They were more concerned with parochial issues of style, human 
interest and, ultimately, commercial appeal. Recruiting a contact was one thing, Joy 
found to his chagrin, having them do your bidding was another and, much more 
difficult, proposition. 
In December 1964, concerns that the Soviets were stealing a march on the IRD in 
the mofussil, or areas outside the subcontinent’s major metropolitan centres, saw a 
regional dimension added to the Department’s Indian armoury. Jonathan Davidson, a 
young graduate recruited by the IRD directly from Cambridge University, was 
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despatched to Calcutta to oversee and expand counter-propaganda operations in 
eastern and southern India, hotbeds of indigenous communist activity. As with Joy, 
Davidson was not declared to the Indian government as an IRD officer, and worked 
undercover as third secretary in the political section of the British mission in 
Calcutta. Davidson’s role was that of a mobile contact maker, identifying new outlets 
for unattributable IRD material amongst politicians, journalists, publishers, and 
academics.114 His area of geographic responsibility was enormous. The young IRD 
officers remit ran from Calcutta, in the north, to Madras, a thousand miles to the 
south, and took in Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Kerala, hundreds of miles further to 
the west. Davidson would go on to have a highly distinguished career in the Foreign 
Office’s information service and, as an accomplished musician, play first flute in the 
Calcutta Symphony Orchestra.115  
On Davidson’s watch, and that of his successor, Ian Knight Smith, who arrived in 
India in March 1967, the IRD added a new tranche of Indians to its burgeoning list of 
contacts. These grew to encompass members of the opposition Praja Socialist Party, 
faculty at Calcutta University, leaders of the tea workers union in Assam, and 
influential figures in the state politics of eastern and southern India, such as P. 
Thimma Reddy, president of Andhra Pradesh Congress Party committee. As in New 
Delhi, IRD’s regional work ran to subsidizing local publishers, such as A. N. 
Nambiar and P.V. Thampy, who operated the news services, FABIANS and Indian 
Press Features. Nambiar and Thampy worked especially closely with the IRD to 
translate its copy into southern Indian languages, obscure its origin, and offer it to 
local journalists for replay in India’s myriad regional newspapers.116  
Although the diversification of its operations to cover eastern and southern India 
was viewed with satisfaction, back in London IRD management were concerned to 
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guard against any tendency to spread the Department’s limited resources too thinly 
across the subcontinent and, in doing so, sacrifice impact in search of reach. ‘IRD 
should,’ its management had concluded by 1967, ‘concentrate more than hitherto on 
the cultivation of influential Congress Ministers, M.P.’s and senior civil servants.’ 
‘We have tended,’ one IRD review of operations in India reflected critically, ‘to 
commit our armour in penny packets against peripheral targets of opportunity and at 
greater cost.’117 Or, put another way, the Department was anxious that its Indian 
operation had fallen into the trap of recruiting contacts on the basis of their 
availability, and had neglected more important but less pliant targets. Moreover, IRD 
officers in the field began to express reservations that the Indian programme risked 
becoming too insular and excessively focused on indigenous communist influence in 
the regions. ‘The local [communist] threat is very much less of a threat to British 
interests and, for that matter, to the Congress Party itself,’ one IRD officer cautioned, 
‘than that posed by the Soviet Union in particular and the Soviet bloc in general.’118 It 
appeared prudent, in Whitehall’s view, to rebalance the IRD’s work in India, and turn 
back to weakening Soviet influence at centre of Indian politics.   
 
V. 
 
As the IRD prepared to realign its operation in India, broader political developments 
in the subcontinent conspired to throw a spanner in the Department’s works. To a 
considerable degree, the IRD had benefited from a reservoir of goodwill towards 
Britain that had accumulated in India in the wake of the Sino-Indian War. As early as 
1963, however, London’s relations with New Delhi had hit a bump in the road 
following an ill-fated and unwelcome British intervention in the Kashmir dispute 
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between India and Pakistan. Worse still, the Labour government of Harold Wilson, 
which had come to power in October 1964, managed to infuriate Indians by charging 
New Delhi with unwarranted aggression during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. 
Towards the end of that year, the Anglophile former Indian high commissioner in 
London, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, lamented to British friends that, ‘It would be 
difficult to exaggerate Britain’s unpopularity in India.’ 119  In a development that 
would have seemed unthinkable only a few years before, the peace talks that 
concluded the 1965 conflict were brokered by Moscow, on Soviet soil, in the central 
Asian city of Tashkent. The Tashkent accord was widely interpreted as emblematic 
of waning British power and influence in South Asia. ‘How strange and intolerable it 
would have seemed to [Lord] Curzon’, The Times opined in January 1966, ‘that the 
affairs of the sub-continent he ruled should be taken to Tashkent to be discussed 
under the patronage of a Russian.’120  
Equally troubling for the IRD was the sudden and unexpected death during the 
Tashkent talks of India’s prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had come to 
power on Nehru’s death, in May 1964. Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, who, unlike 
her father, had little time for, or interest in, the United Kingdom, was co-opted to 
replace Shastri. In New Delhi, officials in the High Commission soon began to refer 
to the ‘Gandhi factor’ in Indo-British relations. Troublingly, the new Indian premier 
was considered to have a considerable ‘chip on the shoulder’ when it came to Britain. 
Indeed, under the stewardship of the left-leaning Gandhi, India’s purportedly 
‘special’ relationship with Britain proved to be anything but ‘special’. With Gandhi at 
the helm, India’s diplomatic, economic, and military links with the Soviet Union 
went from strength to strength. Against a backdrop of diminishing British authority in 
South Asia, a dispirited John Freeman, who Wilson had appointed to replace Gore-
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Booth as high commissioner in India, concluded that his mission had little option 
other than to, ‘lie low for the time being and leave it to the Russians to make the 
running [in India], in the hope of gradually recovering our influence and eventually 
making a comeback later.’121 Or, as John Gordon McMinnies, who, in January 1965, 
had taken over responsibility for the IRD operation in India from Peter Joy, put 
matters, ‘It would be…quite unrealistic in the present post-Tashkent era to expect the 
Congress Government as such to peddle any material critical of the Soviet Union.’122 
In 1967, the political obstacles confronting the IRD in India multiplied. In the 
states of Bengal in eastern India, and Kerala, in the west of the country, electorates 
returned communist governments to office. Overnight, IRD contacts in the Congress 
party, that had been nurtured over many years, were cast to the margins of Indian 
politics. Worse still, allegations surfaced in the Indian communist press that external 
interference had taken place in that year’s national elections. The Indian media fed 
off reports first published in the American west-coast magazine, Ramparts, that 
exposed the CIA’s long-standing financial relationships with a number of 
international educational institutions and cultural bodies, including the Indian 
Committee for Cultural Freedom. 123  In March, CIA activity in the subcontinent 
attracted further unwelcome scrutiny when Svetlana Alliluyeva, daughter of the 
Soviet dictator, Josef Stalin, defected to the West via the US Embassy in New Delhi, 
and was spirited out of India by American intelligence officers.124  
With Indian suspicion of Western intelligence agencies running high, the principal 
IRD officer in Delhi came under suspicion as an ‘undeclared friend’, or MI6 
operative. 125  In response, Freeman ordered the IRD operation to proceed with 
‘particular caution,’ and to temporarily curtail its riskier activities. Specifically, 
Freeman instructed IRD officers to avoid seeking new Indian contacts; suspend 
	 37	
meetings with existing ‘assets’; and implement tighter security measures around the 
distribution of financial ‘incentives.’126 In rationalizing the decision taken to ‘pause’ 
IRD activity, Freeman argued that the attention that had been focused upon the CIA 
in India threatened to, ‘unearth the activities of other Western Missions and perhaps 
link these with the C.I.A. Here we [the British] should be an obvious target.’ 
Furthermore, with the advent of communist state governments eastern and western 
India, Freeman was conscious that, ‘the spread of communist influence is now likely 
to enter the field of Indian domestic politics, and... in the process, the ability of the 
State Governments to uncover—or fabricate—“foreign influences” is of course 
increased.’127 The British high commissioner’s suspicion that Western intelligence 
services faced a rough ride in the subcontinent proved well founded. In an ironic 
twist, Freeman was himself later subjected to a communist disinformation ploy 
involving a forged telegram that detailed fictitious incidents of American interference 
in India’s internal affairs.128  
 
VI. 
 
The ‘pause’ Freeman imposed on IRD work in India lasted only a matter of months. 
A progressive growth in Soviet influence in the subcontinent under the Gandhi 
government, however, underlined by the signing of an Indo-Soviet treaty of 
friendship and cooperation, in 1971, ensured that British counter-propaganda work 
remained on the back foot. In the face of calls from Whitehall for economies to be 
made in overseas spending, Freeman’s successor as high commissioner, Terence 
Garvey, questioned the need for a continued IRD presence on his staff. Towards the 
end of 1971, Garvey informed Whitehall that if financial savings had to be made in 
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India, he was prepared to dispense with the IRD, and to transfer counter-propaganda 
responsibilities to a member of the high commission’s chancery.129 In London, senior 
IRD managers fought a successful rear-guard action to retain the Department’s 
presence in India. It would be foolhardy, the IRD argued, to denude India of a 
specialist counter-subversion presence at a time when, following the outbreak of 
another Indo-Pakistan war and the emergence of the new state of Bangladesh, ‘the 
Soviet Union and China are more closely involved than ever before in the sub-
continent.’ Under new terms of reference, however, P. H. Roberts, the incumbent 
IRD representative, was compelled to undertake ‘straight’ information work 
alongside the department’s covert activities. The IRD’s regional representation in 
India was phased out.130  
By 1972, a new and slimmed down version of IRD, or IRD Mark II, came into 
being. This development reflected the consensus in London that, since its heyday in 
the 1960s, ‘the [IRD] operation had tended to get out of hand; IRD became too big, 
too diffuse and had to be drastically reorganised.’ The Department’s complement of 
staff was halved, and its headquarters relocated from a tower block at Riverwalk 
House, Millbank, to smaller offices in Great George Street.131 In India, reductions in 
the IRD’s footprint coincided with the country slipping outside Whitehall’s list of the 
‘Top 20’ information priorities. Roberts was subsequently forced to assume 
additional responsibility for IRD operations in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri 
Lanka, as well as in India. The enthusiasm for expanding the IRD’s global role that 
had been so evident in Whitehall in the early 1960s, came to represent a dim 
memory. With neither the time nor the funds to sustain the IRD’s network of South 
Asian contacts, Roberts found himself largely confined to New Delhi, where his 
administrative support was supplied by the civilian wife of a British diplomat, who 
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read seven English-language Indian newspapers a day, ‘using her own judgment on 
matters of IRD interest.’132 
In 1975, IRD was compelled to impose a second suspension, or ‘partial embargo’, 
on its operations in India. In June, the Allahabad High Court controversially found 
Indira Gandhi to be guilty of electoral malpractice. The legal ruling threatened to 
invalidate the Indian premier’s status as a member of parliament, and bring down her 
government. Scenting political blood, Gandhi’s opponents took to India’s streets and 
the prime minister responded by declaring a state of emergency, suspended civil 
liberties, and jailed her political opponents. The IRD’s Indian contacts ran for cover, 
fearful of being exposed or imprisoned by an increasingly authoritarian regime that 
appeared obsessed by threats to the nation’s sovereignty, real and imagined. In turn, 
following discussions between the IRD and Foreign Office’s South Asia desk, it was 
agreed that the circulation of counter-propaganda material in India would be 
‘drastically reduced’. The supply of IRD anti-Soviet literature to ‘unofficial 
recipients’, or Indians outside government, stopped. With Gandhi’s administration 
intercepting and censoring communications, local mail ceased being used to deliver 
IRD copy, further restricting its circulation, and all reference to Indian internal 
politics was stripped from the Department’s publications. Roberts effectively found 
himself reduced to servicing a shrinking group of trusted officials in a small number 
of Indian government departments.133 
Prior the IRD’s eventual demise in 1977, on the orders of Labour’s foreign 
secretary, David Owen, the Department continued to justify its by now ‘penny 
packet’ activities in India on the increasingly dubious basis that they retained impact. 
One IRD official had suggested that when it came to counter-propaganda activity in 
the subcontinent, the British ‘eye-dropper can continue to be effective where Russian 
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and American fire hoses may be too indiscriminating always to hit the target, and the 
solution this applies may sting more.’134 However, as the department was forced to 
concede, it remained all but, ‘impossible to quantify the effectiveness of information 
activities, whether covert or overt.’135 Instead, the IRD asked for the value of its work 
in India to be taken largely as an article of faith. Drawing on an agricultural analogy, 
the IRD compared its efforts to the effect of fertilizer. ‘You cannot really tell how 
much it has affected a particular crop as opposed, say, to the weather. But like 
fertilizer you have to put it on.’136  
In Whitehall, where misunderstanding of the IRD and its responsibilities was 
commonplace, some colleagues drew a different, and less flattering interpretation 
from a metaphor that associated the Department with the spreading of manure. 
Within the prevailing climate of détente between East and West, the IRD came under 
intense pressure to justify its continued relevance. One external assessment of the 
Department noted that officials, including many within the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, had long regarded IRD, ‘with deep suspicion as a law unto 
itself, allegedly pursuing its own foreign policy without too much reference to higher 
authority.’137 Such categorizations of the IRD were unfair. But, its operations in India 
did clearly run substantial political risks. They were undeclared to the Indian 
authorities, in breach of Indian law, and, by channelling payments to Indian nationals, 
threatened to position the British government in the crosshairs of the Gandhi 
administration’s fixation with ‘foreign hands’ subverting Indian democracy. A further 
Whitehall review of the IRD, undertaken in 1976, by the retired civil servant and 
former high commissioner to Canada, Sir Colin Crowe, underscored the wider 
dangers for British diplomacy associated with the Department’s covert activity. IRD 
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operations along the lines of those conducted in India, Crowe noted in his report to 
Foreign Office ministers, ‘if they went awry, could cause great embarrassment.’138 
Moreover, in New Delhi, the strong support that the IRD had previously enjoyed 
inside the high commission evaporated in the first half of the 1970s. Leonard 
Appleyard, first secretary in New Delhi, called into question the wisdom of, ‘gearing 
ourselves [Britain] up for a costly counter-propaganda effort against the Russians in 
India.’ Broader political currents and national policies were the decisive factors 
influencing India opinion, Appleyard suggested, and not counter-propaganda work 
conducted around its margins. ‘If our general policy is acceptable here [India]’, the 
British diplomat stressed, ‘we get a good press; if not, we get a bad press, whatever 
we say or do.’139 The same rule applied to the Soviets. In sum, senior British officials 
in India informed Whitehall that a modern counter-subversion rendering of the 
Victorian ‘great game’ in South Asia was simply not worth the candle. The strength 
of the Soviet position in India, coupled with the ‘infertile local soil’, suggested that 
Britain’s counter-propaganda resources would be better employed in, ‘much more 
propitious conditions in other parts of the world…’140 Or, as Sir Terence Garvey 
stated, it seemed imprudent to pour money and manpower into contesting an, 
‘immense Russian information effort [that] consisted mainly of providing second-
class material for mass publication in India.’ Overt and semi-autonomous bodies, 
such as the BIS and the British Council, Garvey counseled the Foreign Office, could 
protect British interests in the subcontinent just as well as the IRD.141  
Criticisms from the periphery reinforced London’s unease that the IRD had 
become outmoded and ineffective in India. Searching questions began to be asked as 
to whether the Department really did influence opinion? Whether it was bloated, 
cumbersome, and over staffed? Whether IRD should be disbanded and integrated 
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within the rest of Britain’s information apparatus? These were questions to which the 
Department’s supporters had no easy answers. The primary objective of IRD in India 
was to counter Soviet influence. Despite sporadic assertions to the contrary, the IRD 
had steered away from claims that it could reach and influence India’s masses. The 
limited resources at IRD’s disposal and the sheer scale of the task in South Asia ruled 
out a broad-based counter-propaganda approach on purely practical grounds, aside 
from anything else. Having instead concentrated on targeting India’s political and 
economic ruling class, the IRD manifestly failed to persuade the Indian government, 
or the nation’s intelligentsia, to turn against Moscow, quite the converse. Indeed, the 
IRD’s major impact in India was felt not in the Soviet sphere, but in the field of 
Chinese counter subversion, a contribution that the IRD itself conceded had probably 
rebounded to Moscow’s advantage.  
 
VII. 
 
The covert counter-propaganda campaign waged by the IRD in India was lengthy, 
involved, and fraught with political risk. It began as a small-scale and largely ad-hoc 
venture. Managed remotely from the Department’s London headquarters throughout 
the 1950s, Britain’s covert propagandists were dependent on the goodwill and 
cooperation of local high commission staff in South Asia. By the mid-1960s, 
however, the IRD had transformed its Indian operation. The Department developed a 
diverse and wide-ranging network for disseminating covert propaganda in India that 
achieved a notable degree of operational complexity. Elements within the upper 
echelons of the Indian government, and the nation’s major political parties, armed 
forces, intelligence services, educational institutions, and press, were marshalled in 
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support of Britain’s anti-communist propaganda offensive. External developments 
impacting upon South Asia during this period, most notably the Sino-Soviet split and 
the Sino-Indian War of 1962, presented an unexpected window of opportunity to the 
IRD, which it was quick to exploit. Above all, the posting of covert IRD field officers 
to India facilitated a significant expansion in the scale of British counter-propaganda 
material disseminated in the subcontinent, and substantially increased the number and 
range of Indian contacts that it reached.  
Nevertheless, the IRD struggled to balance local, national, and global counter-
propaganda priorities in India. Adding regional counter-propaganda capacity failed to 
adequately address lingering problems of over-centralization and deficiencies in 
linguistic, cultural, and political competencies. The IRD officers and administrative 
staff employed in India were invariably over-committed, under-resourced, and 
expected to learn on-the-job. Counter-propaganda messages delivered to Indian 
audiences that focused on communist subversion appeared to fall flat as often as they 
struck home. An over emphasis on threats to Indian sovereignty posed by an 
insidious communist hand and alien ideological dogma, saw Britain’s propagandists 
neglect local concerns and grievances, and squander opportunities to win Indian 
hearts and minds. This was far from atypical behavior, as other studies of Britain’s 
global propaganda operations have shown.142  
Accurately assessing the impact of the IRD campaign in India is problematic. 
Measuring the effectiveness of covert propaganda is notoriously difficult. In 1970, 
one Foreign Office official acknowledged that, ‘there is no accurate measure of the 
effectiveness of information work generally and measuring the effectiveness of IRD 
work in its present form would present even greater difficulty.’143 Nevertheless, when 
judged against the IRD’s political objectives, the Department’s intervention in the 
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Indian subcontinent delivered meagre results, at best. The British set out to discredit 
the CPI in India and weaken support for the Soviet Union. Neither outcome was 
achieved. After 1962, Moscow’s relations with New Delhi went from strength to 
strength, and would remain steadfast until the very end of the Cold War. More 
generally, Indians, at all levels, remained unpersuaded that internal or external 
manifestations of Communism posed a clear and present danger to national 
sovereignty. Put simply, Britain’s global Cold War priorities found little traction in 
an Indian context were security concerns, predominantly in the form of China and 
Pakistan, had little, if anything, to do with doctrinaire politics. At worst, IRD activity 
in the subcontinent can be seen to have harmed Britain’s long-term interests by 
stoking Sino-Indian enmity and, unwittingly, facilitating Indo-Soviet accord. 
On balance, it is difficult to find fault with the argument advanced by prominent 
British diplomats that, from the beginning of the 1970s, in India, at least, the IRD had 
played itself out. Having originally adopted a cautious and circumspect approach to 
intervention in India’s internal affairs. The advent of the Sino-Soviet split, and the 
outbreak of the Sino-Indian War, saw the Department change tack and implement a 
more extensive and aggressive anti-communist propaganda strategy in South Asia. 
Ultimately, the results were disappointing for the British. Nevertheless, given the 
paucity of other options for containing Soviet influence in India available to a cash-
strapped and over-extended Whitehall, gambling on the success of an amplified IRD 
operation made sense. Certainly, employing British soft power in South Asia, 
whatever the strategies limitations in information and propaganda terms, was 
preferable to more expensive and impractical hard power alternatives. 
If the IRD’s counter-propaganda campaign in India lacked tangible results, it 
nevertheless represented a significant episode in the history of Britain’s post-colonial 
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relationship with India. The IRD’s intervention in the Indian subcontinent provides 
telling evidence of Whitehall’s willingness to interfere in the democratic process of a 
sovereign Commonwealth nation, not least by subverting its press. It adds weight to 
the notion that India remained a core sphere of British interest long after 1947, and 
that successive post-war British government’s accepted that it was both correct and 
necessary to covertly influence the internal affairs of a former colony. Much of the 
political and security activity undertaken by Britain in India during the Cold War 
period is yet to be declassified. The work of IRD represents a notable exception, and 
offers rare insight on a major covert operation that Whitehall sanctioned inside India. 
New evidence from official British documents offers up important evidence on the 
nature and extent of the IRD’s interaction with Indian politicians, military personnel, 
journalists, publishers, academics, intellectuals, businessmen, and trade union 
leaders. The IRD operation in India, which was authorized at the highest levels of the 
British government, provides a new and important perspective on the interplay 
between the former colonizer and the formerly colonized in South Asia. 
Ultimately, the IRD’s eyedropper proved unable to cure the Indian patients 
supposed optical malaise, and eradicate what Whitehall perceived as a South Asian 
blind spot in recognising the dangers posed by communist subversion. If anything, 
the medicine administered by the Information Research Department in India served 
only to further irritate the tired eyes through which New Delhi came to view a former 
British ruler with divergent perspectives and conflicting priorities in respect of the 
Cold War in South Asia. 																																																								
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